The Problem of Intellektuelle Anschauung and Its Transformations

From Kant to Mu Zong-san and Phenomenology

 

Ni Liangkang

 

 

In the process of the knowledge transmission from the west to the east, which lasts for over a century, the influence of German philosophy on the eastern thought can be called not only "extensive", bur also "deep". The examples for these two sides are available everywhere: from Kant, Hegel, Marx to Nietzsche, Freud, Husserl, Heidegger etc, their thoughts have always had either apparent or hidden effects on the different levels of the eastern cultures.

Of course, most of these complicated influences and effects are concretely represented with distinct concepts, views, slogans, ideals and problems. The concept of "intellectual intuition" (intellektuelle Anschauung ) in German philosophy is a quite typical example. Its effect in the theoretical deep layer exhibits the extraordinary sight of cultural exchange.

From a historical view, the concept "intellectual intuition" once became a magical password in German philosophy. It was a common idea that "intellectual intuition" in the effective range of pure reason is put up as contradiction in adjecto with Kant. But now it is certain that in the scope of practical reason Kant tried with it to solve the problem of the "highest point" of philosophy or "the highest principle in the whole sphere of human knowledge" [Kant: Critique of pure reason, B 135]. After that, Fichte made an attempt to demonstrate his philosophical starting point, i.e., "I", in virtue of "intellectual intuition".

While in the philosophy of Schelling, "intellectual intuition" is called even "the organ of all the transcendental thoughts" ["Organ alles transzendentalen Denkens", in: Schelling: System des transzendenten Idealismus, S. 59 (vgl. Schelling- W Bd. 2, S. 43)]. "Intellectual intuition" and "transcendental philosophy" are here combined together organically.

But with the further development of the classical German philosophy, or we can say, with the decline of transccndental philosophy after Schelling, the function of "intellectual intuition" is held back quite soon. It is firstly oppugned and refused by Hegel, who looks upon "intellectual intuition" as a too simple matter: "Because it is the easiest manner to put the knowledge on what occurs to someone" (Denn es ist die bequemste Manier, die Erkenntnis darauf zu setzen, - auf das, was einem einfaellt.) [Hegel: Vorlesungen ueber die Geschichte der Philosophie, S. 2280 (vgl. Hegel-W Bd. 20, S. 428)], that is the same as the night, "where all cows are black" (worin alle Kuehe Schwarz sind), or as "the naivety of emptiness on knowledge" (die Naivitaet der leere an Erkenntnis). [Hegel: Phaenomenologie des Geistes, S. 18 (vgl. Hegel-W Bd. 3, S. 22)]. With Schopenhauer, the contemporary and opponent of Hegel's, it is regarded as "correct names" of "humbug and charlatanism (Windbeutelei und Scharlatanerei)". [Schopenhauer: Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung, S. 21 (vgl. Schopenhauer- ZA Bd. 1, S. 17)] It is the one of few harmonies between Hegel and Schopenhauer. After this, Lucacs in Hegel-Marx's camp sees the "intellectual intuition" in Schelling's philosophy as "absurd mystery" and brands it as "the first form of representation of irrationalism" or even as "the irrationalism of pre-fascism".

In sharp contrast to this, "intellectual intuition" exerts deep-seated influence in eastern thought. The most important two thinkers in eastern cultural circle, Nishida Kitaro in Japan and Mu Zong-san in China, each has accepted this concept in their philosophy and understood it in their own way. Nishida comprehends the "intellectual intuition" as "a deep grasp of life". And Mu Zong-san sees the foundation of Chinese philsosphy in the concept of "intellectual intuition" and points out, "Confucianism, Taoism and Buddhism all affirm that 'intellectual intuition' exists." He goes so far as to believe that this concept is "an important idea which forms the difference between the Chinese culture and the western culture". Finally, Heidegger, who wins some inspirations in his research on eastern thought, presents a standpoint far from the western and quite near to the eastern philosophy in this question. He apprehends "intellectual intuition" as a seizing of the Urphaenomen which such persons as Goethe and Husserl have mentioned, or as a seizing of "the structure of entity [Seiendes]", "of absolute entity."

The two attitudes towards the problem of "intellectual intuition" clearly show a well considerable cultural phenomenon. In other words, the different fates, which "intellectual intuition" has experienced in the eastern and western cultures, represent de facto their different characters to a great extent.

Considering the time, I would here just follow and define some fundamental meanings of the concept "intellectual intuition" in Kant's philosophy and the understanding and accepting of this concept in Mu Zong-san's thought. I pay attention to the question: how is a problematic concept in classic German philosophy built into the kernel category in the thought of one of the most important thinkers, if not the most important one, in the 20th century in China. In the end, I would like to give some impetus to solve the problem of "intellectual intuition" from the aspect of phenomenology.

 

 

Whether Kant is the first to put up the concept of "intellectual intuition" remains a matter of indifference. It is important that even if his concept is not raised first by Kant, it becomes the kernel question of philosophy with him for the first time.

Kant's own expositions on "intellectual intuition" are scattered and inconsistent but there are still three elementary contents found in them, which can finally be reduced to Kant's comprehension of the expression "intellectual."

First of all, the "intellectual" of Kant's refers to "understanding" (Verstand), which means the "faculty of connection of given intuitions in a experience" (Vermoegen der Verknuepfung gegebener Anschauungen in einer Erfahrung). He says, "intellectual refers to cognitions acquired through the understanding, and they can also reach our sense world" (intellektuell sind Erkenntnisse durch den Verstand, und dergleichen auch auf unsere Sinnenwelt). [Kant, Prolegomena §34] In opposition to "intellectual" in this sense stands the concept "intelligible". "Intelligible refers to objects, which can be represented only through the understanding and is inaccessible to any of our sensual intuitions" (Intelligible heissen Gegenstaende, so fern sie bloss durch den Verstand vorgestellt werden koennen und auf die keine unserer sinlichen Anschauung gehen kann.) [Kant, Prolegomena § 35] Kant calls "intelligible objects" as "noumenon" or "thing-in-itself" too. We can say, "intellcetual" functions as principle of liaison of phenomenon within experience, and "intelligible" signifies the noumenon, which goes beyond experience and cannot be reached through intuitions. In this contrary usage to "intelligible", the concept of "intellectual" has a positive meaning in Kant.

Of course, the "intellectual" understood this way has nothing to do with "intuition", because as soon as "intellectus" tries to provide intuitions beyond experience, i.e., "nonsensual intuition" or "intellectual intuition", the object of "intellectual intuition" is then non-intuitive "Noumenon" or "lntelligibelia". So in a strict sense, "intellectual intuition" is "intelligible intuition". And this is a contradictio in adjecto in itself, similar to "wooden iron" in Husserl. In the "prolegomena", Kant calls "intellectual intuition" "senseless" as well as "useless" [Prolegomena, § 34]. And in "Critique of pure reason", he regards it as something "that is not what we possess, and of which we even cannot have a "clear insight into the possibility [Critique of pure reason, B307].

This is the first element which "intellectual intuition" contains in Kant. "Intellectual intuition" in this sense is what Kant rejects. From then on the understanding of Kant's concept of "intellectual intuition" is based on these exposition of Kant, namely comprehending "intellectual" as "understanding" (liaison of phenomenon within experience) or better as "intelligible" (the noumenon beyond experience). For example, Heidegger points out in his discussion about "intellectual intuition", "For Kant, nothing else exists outside sensual intuition, only the objects given through senses are knowledgeable."

By Kant however, the concept of "intellectual intuition" contains a second element. This element stands even before the first element in the context of "Critique of pure reason". Kant identifies the "intellectual intuition", which is relative to the second element, with "intuition of self activity". This definition appears hard to understand at first. But if we link this with Kant's understanding of the concept "intelligence", which is related to "intellectual", the matter will become clear. "Intelligence" means here "I" or "soul". In "Critipue of pure reason", Kant has explicated it in different ways, for example: "I exists as an intelligence" [B 158] OR "I as intelligence of thinking subject" [B 155] or "soul" is "the idea of intelligence" [B710] etc. He illustrates further that we can call ourselves "intelligence" because we are conscious that our thinking activity is spontaneous: "it is owing tothis spontaneity that I entitle myself an intelligence" [B158]. In other words, the existence of "I" is defined through the activity of "I think".

So the second meaning of "intellectual" deals with the spontaneity of thinking or the self-activity of subject. In a short word, it involves the fundamental principle of the subjectivity-philosophy since Descartes, that is, the "self-onsciousness" as "highest point" of philosophy. Kant attaches so much importance to the "self-consciousness" in this sense as to saying, "to that highest point we must ascribe all employment of the understanding, even the whole of logic, and conformably therewith, transcendental philosophy. Indeed this faculty of apperceptions is the understanding itself." [B 135]

The "intellectual intuition" with regard to the "intelligence" in this sense is at first the intuition of the subject on itself. If the "intellectual intuition" in the first sense means "intuition in the way of understanding", the "intellectual intuition" in the second sense should first of all refer to "the intuition of intelligence of itself".

The concept "intellectual intuition" in the second sense has obviously had an impact on such post- Kantian philosophere as Fichte and Schelling. They apprehend "the essence of intelligence" as "observation of itself", and "the immediate self-consciousness" as "back-movement of intelligence" of "intellectual intuition". The concept of "intellectual intuition" in Mu and Nashida contains the meaning in the same aspect, either titled as "intuition of life" of titled as "intuition of will", as "intuition of conscience" etc.

However, Kant himself does not go so far effectively. In his further consideration of the "I" as "intelligence", he makes distinctions between the consciousness on self-activity and the thinking of I. Strictly speaking, the former belongs to intuition and the latter belongs to thinking. In other words, the self-activity (thinking) is given to us in the way of the "sensual intuition", but the "I" is just conceived in the way of "the intellectual thinking" without appearing. In this way, the "self-activity" as phenomenon and the "I" as Noumenon separate themselves from each other. The activity of "thinking" gets into consciousness, but the I-subject is not recognized. In this sense, Kant says, "the consciousness of itself is thus very far from a knowledge

of the self." [B 158]

Following this explanation, the intuition of the self-activity of thinking could be an intuition in a strict sense and an experience of appearances. And the intuition of the subjective "I" behind the self-activity is contradictio in adjecto too, and it is therefore an "intelligible intuition", a thinking of the non-appearing noumenon. We could understand now why Kant defines the character of "subject" as "intelligible". It means, just as the object-world in itself does not appear in the sense of sensual objects and it is thus metaphysical, the subject-I in itself does not in the sense of sensual objects (self-activity of thinking) either and it is therefore metapsychical. So Kant says, "the concept of the 'I' in the psychological principle 'I think', i.e., the concept of the "self" in all the representations of which I am conscious, "tells us nothing" [A 401], because in a strict sense, "the consciousness of myself in the representation 'I' is not an intuition", "this I has not the least predicate of intuition". In other words, that the representation of "I" or self-consciousness offers is not the intellectual concept about objects.

But the subject as 'subject of thinking' or "intelligence" has in Kant's opinion still the character of "empirical", that is to say, the say the self-activity of thinking, of which we are aware and intuitive. It is seen as belonging to subject: thinking is my thinking.

According to this, the self-consciousness in sense of self-thinking and self-cognition through intuition of the self are entirely different in Kant: the former is the appearing existence of the "I", and the latter the objective existence of the "I". We could say too that self-consciousness sees correlative acts just as "mine", and self-cognition deals with the question "what is the 'I'".

The latter question, i.e., the question of knowledge about noumenon, is according to Kant not to be resolved through human understanding. But he does exclude the possibility of a solution to this question. We just cannot have insight into the possibility. As Windelband says, "the possibility of this faculty is so little to deny as its reality to affirm." (Die m?glichkeit eines solchen Verm?gens ist so wenig zu verneiner, wie seine Verwirklichkeit zu bejahen). [Lehrbuch der Geschichte der Philosophie, S. 470]

Kant ascribes this possibility to God at last. It is the third element which "intellectual intuition" has in him: "original intuition". Kant calls it somewhere else "intellectus archetypus" or "divine understanding" too, "which not only presents to itself the objects which are not given, but through this representation the objects should themselves be given or produced". [B 732, B145] The so-called "intuitus originarius" means "the intuition which can itself give us the existence of its object" [B72]. The opposite from this is intuitus derivativus. Kant means that, either inner intuition or outer intuition is in a strict sense not "intuition of understanding" or "intelligible intuition", but "sensual intuition", therefore "intuitus derivativus". Whereas, the "intellectual intuition" "only belongs to the primordial being (Urwesen)", and it is "intuitus originarius" [B 72]. "Original" has here the meaning of "original constitution," We can signify this intuition as "creative intuition" too, because it is on one hand not a passive receptive intuition but an intuition, through which the existence of given objects is determined in the same process of intuition. On the other side, it is not an active spontaneous intuition, because it is not, like the thinking of neumenon, Just a presupposition and tells us nothing outside our experience, but it produces its correlates. This is also the main understanding of Mu Zong-san about the concept "intellectual intuition" in Kant: "it is not a faculty of cognition but that of

creation", "a faculty of production".

More attention here that Kant sometimes explains "intellectual intuition" in this sense of "intuitus originarius" as "imagination", or more strictly as "productive imagination", which finds itself between sensuality and intellectuality. The basic definition of imagination runs as follows: "imagination is the faculty of representing in intuition an object that is not itself present" [B 151], so Kant brings it (at least in edition A of "Critique of pure reason") into the category of "intellectual intuition", and it means "one of the fundamental faculties of the human soul"[A 124], which connects the intellectual concept with the sensual intuition.

Of course, the problem here is in which sense imagination is intuition? If, as Kant says, it is through imagination that the intellectual concept can be connected with the sensual intuition, the imagination itself should not be an "intuition" in a genuine sense, but something between intellectuality and sensuality. It is neither a blind "thinking of intellectuality" nor an empty intuiting of sensuality. It is rather a "spiritual seeing" and a producing through it, in other words, it is a creative seeing of a seeing production, like what Merleaur-Ponty calls "the third eye" and the corresponding "spiritual image". Here the "intellectual intuition" is still "creative" and "original", but not a "godly" activity any more, but a "human" activity.

Though Kant himself and Fichte subsequent to him are occupied enough with the concept of imagination, we cannot say that their explanation concerned are as clear as possible. But it provides the followers with space for interpretation. In Schelling then, "intellectual intuition" in this sense it not any more different form "artistic intuition". The connection between "intellectual intuition" and "artistic intuition", which is nearly lost in Kant, is recovered in Schelling again. It is due to the consequence of the influence of Schelling that Nashida later comprehends "intellectual intuition" as "the intuition which is possessed by artists, religionists and so on." Let's take a sum-up now. The analysis here shows that the concept of Kant's "intellectual intuition" has at least three fundamental meanings at least:

1. In the dimension of the external intuition as "intelligible intuition" of some non-objectified "transcendental object", for example the intuition of the "world" or of "the thing in itself". "Intellectual" means here "the orientation to" or "the relationship with" "the objective noumenon" above all. "Intellectual intuition" is simply to be interpreted as "metaphysical intuition."

2. In the dimension of the internal intuition as "intelligible intuition" of some non-objectified "transcendental object", for example the intuition of "I" or of "freedom of the will". "Intellectual" means here "the orientation to" or "the relationship with the subjective noumenon". "Intellectual intuition" is simply to be interpreted as "psychical intuition".

3. The creative intuition or imagination in the sense of the "intuitus originarius". "Intellectual intuition" here is understood as "faculty of creation". But in principle just God has it. In case of human being, it amounts to "imagination". "Intellectual intuition" is simply to be interpreted as "creative intuition". In these different meanings, the first two are limitative concepts, i.e., negative ones. Only the third is positive. Since then the subsequent adoption and development of the concept "intellectual intuition" in the west and the east is essentially based on these three original significations.

 

 

Up to now the great effect, which the problem of "intellectual intuition" has caused in the thought history of the world, is embodied without doubt in the thought-system of Mu Zong-san. The two books, which Mu has finished in his later period, namely "Intellectual Intution and Chinese Philosophy" as well as "Appearance and Thing in itself", gove overall expositions about Kant's philosophical system, in particular deep- seated analysis about the problem of "intellectual intuition". He has noticed the important meaning of all of Kant's insights, and pointed out, "the major crux thereby is whether intellectual intuition exists or not".

Mu Zong-san believes that the concept of "intellectual intuition" is "an important idea which forms the difference between Chinese culture and western culture". He tries outgoing form here to accept, understand and transform "intellectual intuition" in Kant. And he hopes, "we can win new motivations through the encounter of the classical Chinese philosophy and Kant's philosophy, and we can see the signification and value of the tradition of Chinese philosophy and its mission of epoch and its renascence, and we can see lacks of Kant's philosophy too". The first basis for the realization of this hope should lie on the understanding and evolvement of the Kant's concept "intellectual intuition".

Today we are justified to say that "intellectual intuition" is a fundamental starting-point for Mu Zong-san's interpretations of Chinese classical thoughts with the help of Kant. Precisely thanks to this, it provides us with a fundamental starting-point for our grasping of Mu Zong-san's thought-system.

The corresponding review of Mu Zong-san in "Intellectual Intuition and Chinese Philosophy" is mainly based on the second and third meaning, which Kant endowed to "intellectual intuition". From the second meaning (i.e., the "meta-psychical intuition"), Kant's definition is negative. Therefore, Mu Zong-san also identifies the non-self-appearing subjective "I" or soul with "thing-in -itself" and the conscious activities of subject with "appearance" of "psychic appearance". In his opinion, it is a dual opposition that comes out here: on one hand, it is "the view of psychic appearance". It means that this is "a thought, which exists by thinking and ceases to exist by the cease of thinking". And on the other hand, it is "the view of thing in itself". It means something, which is "a movement without moving and a thought without thinking". How could both "the psychic appearance" and "the mind in itself" communicate with each other? - This question is unsolvable according to Kant. So Mu Zong-san points out, "all difficulties lie on the question, how can a subject intuit itself inwardly".

For the solution to this difficulty, Mu Zong-san expects a speccial art of cognition, namely the "intellectual intuition" rejected by Kant. He gives this concept positive meanings and he thinks that it can interpret the excellence of the whole Chinese philosophy: "If the humanity has really not the intellectual intuition, the whole Chinese philosophy must break down completely and the painstaking effort of many thousand years must go to waste, just as vain hopes." And on the side of the western philosophy, it is devoid of the tradition of "intellectual intuition" in the positive sense, so "it [intellectual intuition] cannot be seen as possible even through Kant's wisdom."

This way of "intellectual intuition" is either called "apperception", "godly manifestation" with the concepts of Leibniz- Kant of "heaven cognises (presents) the beginning or all things" (Yi -Zhuan), "knowing without knowledge" etc. with the concepts of Chinese philosophy. It is evident that the contents, which Mu Zong- san understands in the tile of "intellectual intuition", are numerous and complicated and that they contain nearly all the methodological characters of Chinese philosophy. Thus besides the above- mentioned formulations, he also calls "intellectual intuition" as "the will-less viewing", "the solitary awareness", "the complete consciousness" and sometimes as "thorough knowledge", "evident cognition" etc.

If these contents summarized and arranged, some different elements are roughly acquired in the concept of "intellectual intuition" understood by Mu Zong-san. Even if he himself does not distinguish this definitely, we can see in his own explications at any rate the following three essence- factors, which relate themselves each other but cannot be reduced any more at last:

1) "Original intuition" or "primitive intuition" (relative to the "sensual intuition" as "secondary intuition"). Mu Zong-san finds out that the "intellectual intuition" in this sense is also "the cognizing (presenting)" in the so-called "heaven cognises (presents) the beginning of all things" in "Yi Zhuan", it is "the intuition of the beginning of all things". In this interpretation of the concept "intellectual intuition", Mu Zong-san has made use of Wang Yang-ming's concept of "conscience", i.e., the "conscience as basis of all things on haven and earth", In other words, "the cognizing of heaven" is seen as "conscience", and the "beginning" means "the basis of all things on haven and earth".

The "intellectual intuition" in this sense is also the grasp of Kant's "foundation of the metaphysic of moral". "This grasp is both "heavenly" and "godly", i.e., "heavenly and godly". The "Heaven" in the Chinese philosophy and the "God" in the western philosophy accord themselves with each other. They designate a transcendent ground. Mu Zong-san defines it with each other. They designate a transcendent ground. Mu Zong-san defines it with the "nature" in Mengzi's "good" or Kant's "freedom" and "autonomy". What is acquired through "intellectual intuition" in this senses "heavenly fate", "heavenly nature", "heavenly mind", "heavenly human", or in Kant's words, "godly fate", "godly nature", "godly mind", "godly human", - The basic characters of the corresponding "intellectual intuition" can be epitomized as primitive, original, or as god-produced, natural respectively.

2) "Vertical intuition" (relative to the "sensual intuition" as "horizontal intuition"). Mu Zong-san identifies this meaning of "intellectual intuition" with the former one, or at least he explicates it in combination with the former. For example he says, "If we have a definite understanding about the fundamental ideas of Confucianism, Buddhism and Taoism, and if we know where the ultimate problem is, we shall know that these three systems direct itself at the ultimate and last stratum." "We generally call them vertical systems." And in the same place he says further, "All that directs itself at this final and last stratum belongs to vertical systems." But in this "vertical" is evidently contained a meaning different from "original". In "Appearance and Thing in Itself", Mu Song-san speaks about "through haven and earth, through past and present". In "Lectures on the Theory of the Four Causes" afterwards, he says, "this 'knowledge' is such a knowledge in the sense of vertical", but "the knowledge in the sense of cognition is a horizontal one and has the opposition of subject and object."

This "vertical" means firstly "creative" and "genetic". Therefore Mu Zong-san says that "intellectual intuition" is "a principle of creation and not a principle of cognition". He finds the theory of Confuciansim as the most representative for vertical systems: "It starts by human, and opens the ideas of 'nature and substance'". Then "vertical" contains also the meanings of "development", "linking-up", that is to say, the so-called "the echo of being", "the continuum of the wise life". The "vertical" in this sense mainly means the circulation and linking-up of "the source of our life, of our wisdom and our creation of moral". Not having set a high value on Hegel's thought -system. Mu Zong-san is in agreement with Hegel on the respect of the historical, genetic consciousness. - The characters of the according "intellectual intuition" can be

epitomised as historical, genetic, lively, or we can say temporal, being.

3) "Essential intuition" or "genuine intuition"(relative to the "sensual intuition" as "objective intuition"). Mu Zong-san explains "intellectual intuition" in this sense mostly with the help of Heidegger's "Eject", i.e., "being-in -itself produced inwardly." But this manner is not suitable and is not consistent with Heidegger's basic position. Maybe it is more appropriate to explain with the aid of Husserl's "essential intuition", because it is with this method that Husserl grasps the essential moments and structure of the pure consciousness. Mu Zong-son says too, "Through the function of 'apperception' we are conscious of a constant and invariable 'ego', i.e. the soul-mind-substance itself, or called as genuine subject, genuine ego." "If we want to have an intuition on this genuine ego as such, this intuition must be intellectual, and not sensual." It is to notice another point, at which Mu Zong-san is in keeping with Husserl: Mu Zong-san thinks that the "genuine ego" discussed here is not the individual ego, but the "absolute ego" or "pure ego" called by Husserl. He says, "'Mind' mainly means the absolute universal mind, which exists through all ages one and only".

Mu Zong- san signifies the "being-in-itself of mind" as "so-being". It does not appear, it is not "appearance of mind", but the "Bhutatathata" (Soheit in German) in the Buddhist sense. We can say too that it is not the "essence" (Sosein), but the "existence" (Dasein). If "intellectual intuition" has an object, this object is a kind of "intuition- less being", or of "cognition-less being". Mu Zong-san points out, "the ontological character of the understanding is not to be given up". But this "being" must not be an intuitive being. Therefore the so-called "intellectual intuition" is namely "objectless intuition", "because the duty of the intuition is to realize the being of something as what it is, but not to justify the understanding of the winding appearance of something that already exists. The latter is a matter of the understanding and sensibility". - The characters of the according "intellectual intuition" can be epitomized as essential, so-being, appearance-less while appearance-ful.

Of course, in a general view, the correlates of all three kinds of "intellectual intuition" represent the same; consequently he does not distinguish these correlates furthermore and sees them at most ad the three characters of the same thing. Is is evident that the way he does is based on his Confucian position. He says, "In China, Confucianism substitutes the Tao-substance for God, and the mind-substance is in one with the Tao-substance, so just one is left in the end. If you call it God, it is God; if you cal it freedom, it is freedom; if you cal it immortal soul, it is immortal soul."

Therefore, to summarize the functions of the concept "intellectual intuition" in Mu Zong-san's philosophical thoughts, we can say that this concept really offers Mu Zong-san a full new aspect of a new fundamental starting-point as mentioned before for the inspection of Chinese Philosophy and even of the whole eastern and western philosophy. It makes him possible to surpass the other thinkers who are not familiar with the western philosophy in the extensity of the horizon and the strictness of the analysis.

Finally it is to make mention of two basic goals, to which Mu Zong-san's explications on the "intellectual intuition" have aimed: he tries to reinterpret the basic characters of Confucianism, Buddhism and Taoism in Chinese culture with it on one hand, and the other hand he wants to make up for the shortage of Kant's philosophy and even of the whole western philosophy with it. The intention of the latter is a little farfetched, because in the western thoughts, although idea of "intellectual intuition" is not dominant, there isn't a lack of it. For example, we can find it in Fichte and Schelling. Nastida's understanding of "intellectual intuition" is based mainly on Schilling's interpretations.

 

 

It seems that we can sum up the discussions made up to now: the western philosophy, having developed until, Kant, becomes visible on two basic lines: on is the line of metaphysical doctrines, and the other is that of the positive theories. Through the advancing of the negative concept of "intellectual intuition", Kant differentiates the two lines entirely. It is due to this that the oriental thinkers of modern time can see where the ultimate problems lie with the help of this concept of Kant's. And the charm of Kant's philosophy consists in the fact that it clearly points out where the problems lie.

On one had, the insisting of metaphysical doctrines results in mysticism at last, which was a home for nearly all metaphysicians to return to. On the other hand, the carrying out of positive theories results in the collapse of any metaphysical teachings on moral. That is a difficult position, with which the humanity is confronted at present. Kant does his utmost to avoid this dilemma. Nashida is aware of this point after Kant, and Mu Zong-san also sees clearly the root of this problem. They make their choice in their own ways as to the problem, either with a preference for metaphysical doctrines, or with a preference for positive theories, but neither of them managed to clear up this

dilemma.

A comparatively more effective attempt on the problem "intellectual intuition" is newly offered by phenomenologists. When they take over this problem, they have already seen their assignment to be faced with: If the positive concept of "intellectual intuition" is tenable, if the third way between metaphysical doctrines and positive theories is possible, it must satisfy the threefold claims: 1. It must possess the function of lawgivers, i.e. the function to give the original fundament for itself. 2. It must surpass the manacle of the thinking mode of subject ad object, i.e., abandon the empirical-positive position. 3. It must also be a distinct insight, i.e., free itself from the hue of mysticism.

Husserl, the originator of phenomenology, touches this problem firstly in "Logical investigations". He still would like to work under the title of "intuition", but he expands it from the simple to the general. Concretely speaking, Husserl distinguishes "the super-sensual intuition" from "the sensual intuition". The former is also called "the essential" or "the caregorical intuition". The phenomenological method of consciousness-analysis makes Husserl possible to differentiate the two essential moment "signification-intention" (Bedeutungsintention) and "signification -fulfilling" (Bedeutungserfuellung) in all intuitive acts. He calls them figuratively "aiming at" and "shooting" too. When our consciousness receives some sensual data, it always has an intention to synthesise and integrate them, and recognise them as an object, a table for example. And this intention shall be further fulfilled in the more and more abundant sensual data. The constitution of sensual objects follows this way all the time.

Now, what is the case with the "intellectual intuition"? Husserl distinguishes here further the moment of "sensual datum" (material intention) from the moment of "categorical form" (formal intention) in the "signification- intention". He says, "the prue sensuality can never provide the categorical intention with a filling-out, more exactly speaking, it can never provide the intetion containing categorical forms with a filling-out." This fact, which he points out, can explain why the categorical intuition is such an action without objects: that is because, while categorical intentions like "being", "and", "or" etc. are going on, they can never fulfil themselves in sensual data. That is to say, the categorical of formal intuition is still such an intuition, which is founded in the "sensual intuition", bur cannot be filled out in the sensual data.

Accordingly we can define "intellectual intuition" this way: it is such an intuition, whose categorical intention must have sensual data as its basis, but cannot be fulfilled in sensual data. In other words, in the "intellectual intuition", something formal is immediately intended, but it cannot be filled out in sensual data. In fact, we are not able to imagine a categorical form, which exists without any sensual data, even if this categorical form is so abstract as "being", "time" or "space". After that, Husserl expands the "intellectual intuition" to the essential intuition (seeing of an essence) in general. Essences and ideas, such as "one", "red", "table" and so on, all deal with the ideal intentions, which start from sensual data, but they cannot be fulfilled in them. Therefore, Husserl in justified to maintain: "The old epistemologycal antithesis of sensuality and understanding acquired its final clarification awaited by us through the distinction between the simple intuition or the sensual intuition and the founded intuition or the categorical intuition.

This result of intentional analysis has also its influence on another phenomenologist Heidegger afterward. He finds the special characters of the "categorical intuition" pointed out by Husserl and connects it with the intuition of time and that of being. According to the analysis of the philosophers after Kant, Heidegger has already had the insight into the fact: Although Kant differentiates between sensuality and understanding, and disaffirms the "intellectual intuition", yet his affirmation of the forms of intuition themselves, time and space, are neither sensual nor intellectual, because time and space cannot be sensually intuited, but they do not belong to categories of understanding either. Therefore, there must exist something that can be called as "intellectual intuition". It is due to this that Heidegger lays excessive stress on the concept of "imagination" in his "Kant and the problem of Metaphysics", and sees it as "building force". It is both a "receptive" ability and a "creative" one. Meanwhile, from Husserl's interpretation of "intellectual intuition" in "logical investigations", Heidegger wins a starting-point of the problem of being, which he follows with interest in life: "The distinguishing between the sensual and the intellectual intuition worked out here unveils itself for me in its range for the definition of the 'manifold signification' of entity", "so, illuminated by the phenomenological attitude, I was introduced onto the road of the problem of being".

Heidegger's reception of Husser's thought of "categorical intuition" is embodied concretely in the fact that on one hand "what is represented in the ideas cannot be freely imagined, it must be known itself in a knowledge". Essentially speaking, this knowledge is an "intuition", an "immediate representation of what is meant in its self-presence of being", and it turns itself to God, the world and the essence of human being (freedom), i.e., to the totality of the existential entity. On the other hand, this knowledge, taking the fact of freedom for example, is not positive knowledge. It cannot be exhibited like the gastrelcoma-nidus on the X-ray -plate. As for this fact, we can neither see nor hear it, neither touch nor smell of taste it. Therefore, this knowledge is a "non-objective knowledge", What it wants to know is "nothing else but the struchure of the entity, which now does not stand as a object opposite to the knowledge, but forms itself in the knowledge, this self-forming is the absolute being". What Heidegger articulates here reminds us quite easly of Mu Zong-san's ideas in "intellectual intuition". It is in the same sense that Heidegger says, "An idea is only guide to discovering, but not the discovered itself." This similar analysis and description consist in Heidegger's grasp of the relationship between being and entity: Being cannot be separated from entity, it is "always being of entity", but being itself is neither entity nor the whole o entity.

We might as well make mention of Scheler, another important philosopher of phenomenology, whose definition of the "personality" follows the same orientation: Personality can never be an "object" and it can never be given us as an object, but it is the highest problem, which is discussed by ethics. Scheler makes a new definition for the word "intuition", which is even more clarified than that of Husserl: It means "not necessarily the image of contents", but "the immediateness in the given of objects". "Intuition" in this sense is the same as an immediate awakening of the life itself in the life. Scheler also calls it "Er-leben des leben". It stands opposite to the perception as "gelebtes leben". The correlate of the former is primary, and that of the latter is secondary, and so on. Scheler's distinguishing between "emotional Er-leben" and "perceptive Er-leben" reminds us of Mu Zong-san's differentiation between "vertical intuition" and "horizontal intuition" too. We can say that "intellectual intuition" in Scheler appears in the form of "intuition of the life". Precisely as Heidegger in his later period admits that he himself is enlightened by Husserl's analysis of "categorical intuition" in the respect of the problem of being, he also points out in the early "Being and Time" that what Scheler accentuates I the problem of "non-objective personality" is exactly what Husserl has proposed.

We cannot make a further detailed discussion on this and we just have to leave one point confirmed here above all: The problem of "intellectual intuition" has acquired a further clarification in phenomenology, and it has also become a fundamental moment through the vein of phenomenology.

According to the analysis above, phenomenology has really made a mighty advance in the respect of "seeing" and "description". As for the dilemma in regard to "intellectual intuition", it provides a more convincing programme, which neither abandons the intuitive insights, nor does it mystify the metaphysical theories. Thereupon, the phenomenology can show a possible middle course between the metaphysical doctrines and the positive theories. Meanwhile, the constitutional analysis of Husserl's phenomenology endows the correlates of the "intellectual intuition" with the same right as those of the "sensual intuition": They are all what is originally constituted. In other words, even if the fact of freedom, for example, cannot be fulfilled in the sensual data, it still possesses the status of knowledge, even that of the primary knowledge. As far as this is concerned, the explanation of phenomenology can satisfy the threefold claims above in a certain degree.

Of course, the "intellectual intuition" is thus still not an open sesame, which can resolve all philosophical difficult problems. Such an open sesame does not exist at all. But the phenomenological analysis shows that "intellectual intuition" has already become a possible bridge for the communication between the metaphysical doctrines and the positive theories. Therefore, Levinas is justified to say, "Due to its renunciation of the descriptive method, the constitution of types and the persistence of the concepts, the traditional speculation has jumped over quite a few research fields. The incontestable contribution of phenomenology lies at the requirement to carry on systematic and endurant descriptions, which certainly are preliminaryin the process of 'Returning to the thing itself'. So phenomenology is available for both positivists and metaphysicians."

 

2002年01月01日